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Abstract  
In this paper I critically engage with a methodological approach in contemporary political theory – unconstrained 
utopianism – which holds that we can only determine how we should live by first giving an account of the principles 
that would govern society if people were perfectly morally motivated. I provide reasons for being skeptical of this 
claim. To begin with I query the robustness of the principles unconstrained utopianism purportedly delivers. While 
the method can be understood as offering existence proofs, because we can devise other situations in which morally 
flawless decision making would unearth alternative sets of principles I argue that such proofs tell us surprisingly little 
about how we should live in general. Drawing on this point, I contend that normative models that wish away certain 
phenomena which are uncontroversially central to any account of politics cannot plausibly claim to tell us how we 
should live in political society. I conclude by offering a more positive sketch of why avoiding this brand of utopianism 
might not represent a problematic capitulation to the morally nonideal and suggest that theorizing in light of certain 
constraints may be a precondition of good normative theorizing itself.            
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An influential strand of contemporary analytic political theory tells us how we should live by 
offering an account of the principles that would govern society if people were perfectly morally 
motivated. Even though we are obviously not morally flawless beings, advocates of this approach, 
which I refer to as unconstrained utopianism, hold that it is only when we grasp the nature of such 
principles that we can rigorously diagnose what is wrong with our politics as it currently is and 
comprehend the nature of the kind of ideal society that we should either aspire towards or 
bemoan our inability to achieve. This methodological stance accordingly assumes that a profitable 
discussion can be had by political theorists outlining their visions of the nature of moral perfection 
and using these visions as preliminary blueprints for political design.  
I want to scrutinise this way of doing political theory. I will do so by chiefly engaging with 
two important recent pieces of political philosophy – G.A. Cohen’s Why not socialism? and Jason 
Brennan’s Why not capitalism? – that wholeheartedly embrace unconstrained utopianism as a 
method. First, I query the robustness of the principles unconstrained utopianism purportedly 
delivers. While the method can be understood as offering existence proofs – that is, as offering 
reasons to think that there are possible worlds in which various moral principles capture how we 
would ideally live – when we devise other situations in which morally flawless decision making 
would unearth alternative sets of principles it reveals that such proofs tell us surprisingly little 
about how we should live in general. I then argue that if we are to choose between the principles 
that competing models of morally perfect decision making deliver, we need to decide which 
model best represents the kind of practice we are seeking guidance about. As a result political 
theorists should not to wish away certain phenomena which are uncontroversially central to any 
account of politics.1 I conclude by offering a more positive sketch of why avoiding this brand of 
utopianism might not represent a problematic capitulation to the morally nonideal – in fact 
theorizing in light of certain constraints may be a precondition of good theorizing itself.  
 
What is unconstrained utopianism? 
Theorists who endorse unconstrained utopianism deny that the principles which tell us how we 
should live are constrained by any factual considerations about how we are likely to act, or what 
kinds of political institutions we can realistically be expected to achieve.2 This is because they 
stress that “there are lots of things we can’t do or might not be able to do that we know are good 
to do”. For example, as Jason Brennan observes, “even if it were impossible to cure AIDS we 
know that it would be better if we could”.3 As a result, unconstrained utopians hold that “we 
judge practical rationality, as we judge justice, and the normative in general, independently of 
factual possibility”.4  
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This conceptual claim about the nature of moral thinking leads unconstrained utopians to 
argue that if we are to answer the question “how should we live?” we must uncover the most 
intrinsically morally desirable way of living together which, in turn, requires us to consider what 
would be best if people had “morally perfect motivations” because in the best possible society all 
people would be committed to acting as morality demands.5 Taking various kinds of moral 
imperfection into account cannot tell us what is truly morally desirable because it allows “ignoble 
human motivations to constrain the content of our theories”.6 As a matter of logic we must 
therefore begin our theorizing by positing utopian situations in which “people always do the right 
thing for the right reason, know what they are doing, and feel the right way about it”.7 If we do 
not, our normative theories will be tainted by our morally imperfect motivations and the less than 
ideal status quo we find ourselves in.  
Even though such theories will probably generate principles that we are highly unlikely to 
meet, unconstrained utopians insist that their methodological approach does not violate ought 
implies can. This is because a moral principle can be unlikely to be complied with without 
demanding more of us than we can do.8 Consider David Estlund’s example of a situation in which 
someone “pleads that he is not required to refrain from dumping [household garbage by the side of 
the road] because he is motivationally unable to bring himself to do it”.9 As Estlund argues, it is 
absurd to think that this person’s motivations are a constraint on how we should morally demand 
they act because can’t will is not coextensive with can’t do. This is because “a person is able to (can) 
do something if and only if, were she to try and not give up, she would tend to succeed”.10 Given 
that someone would succeed in not dumping their garbage by the side of the road if they tried not 
to, we can coherently say that they could refrain even if they won’t actually refrain. As a result, 
unconstrained utopians hold that “the inability to bring oneself to do something (to will to do it) 
might coexist with an ability to do that thing”.11 They accordingly claim that there is nothing 
wrong with a normative theory which refuses to “concede any facts that represent moral failings”, 
even if they are basic features of human nature.12 The key issue we must ask when we are 
confronted by various factual considerations about human motivation or moral incapacity is 
“whether or not those incapacities are, for all their naturalness, forms of morally deficient will or 
concern” and as Estlund notes, “vicious, or complacent, or selfish concerns are not somehow 
morally sanitized if they should happen to be characteristic of humans”.13   
In consequence, unconstrained utopians argue that even if various facts about human 
incapacity can rightly exclude us from endorsing highly idealistic institutional proposals this does 
not mean that highly idealistic principles fail to capture the truth about how we ought to live. For 
example, even if it would be foolish to institute garbage policies which ignore the prevalence of 
ignoble motivations it does not follow that the principles which underwrite such proposals fail to 
capture what we should do. To this end, unconstrained utopianism holds that when any principles 
are rejected due to our motivational capacities “we may then ask what we should say about the 
putatively excluded principle on the counter-factual hypothesis that it could be obeyed. And it is 
only when we thus clear the deck of facts about capacity and get the answer to that counterfactual 
question that…we reach the normative ultimate”.14 For this reason, the only pertinent factual 
obstacles facing the principles we derive from thinking about situations of moral perfection are 
ones of design and such obstacles should not affect our assessment of a principle’s moral 
desirability.15 Allowing our normative theorizing to be constrained by considerations that only 
arise due to our moral flaws, causes us to misunderstand the ideal and the merely feasible and this 
“leads to confusion, and confusion generates disoriented practice”.16  
I think that we can only evaluate unconstrained utopianism as a methodological approach 
by examining the character of the first-order argumentation it engenders. Accordingly I now turn 
to the illustrative examples of such theorizing offered by G.A. Cohen and Jason Brennan.17 
Cohen’s Why Not Socialism? attempts to offer a compelling moral argument for thinking that a 
form of socialism represents the best way that we could live together. To do so Cohen asks us to 
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imagine the best possible camping trip. On such a trip Cohen argues that the resources the 
campers use – pots and pans, oil, coffee, fishing rods, canoes, a soccer ball, decks of cards and so 
forth – are under collective control and that the campers have shared understandings about when 
and why particular campers will use them based on their enjoyment of or aversion to particular 
activities.18 For example if I enjoy fishing but you enjoy cooking we may decide to carry out these 
tasks exclusively. The collectivist and voluntarist spirit of the trip ensure that “there are no 
inequalities to which anyone could mount a principled objection”.19 This makes the trip uniquely 
enjoyable: each camper enjoys “a roughly similar opportunity to flourish, and also to relax, on 
condition that she contributes, appropriately to her capacity, to the flourishing and relaxing of 
others”.20  
Cohen contends that two key socialist principles are realized on this camping trip. The 
first, socialist equality of opportunity, “seeks to correct for all unchosen disadvantages, disadvantages 
that is, for which the agent cannot herself reasonably be held responsible, whether they be 
disadvantages that reflect social misfortune or disadvantages that reflect natural misfortune”.21 It 
prevails when “differences of outcome reflect nothing but difference of taste and choice, not 
differences in natural and social capacities and powers”.22 The second, the community principle, 
“constrains the operation of the egalitarian principle by forbidding certain inequalities that the 
egalitarian principle permits”.23 For example, suppose that when a dozen campers arrive at the 
campsite for one night of camping there are six state of the art single-person trailers they can 
choose to use and that to maximise overall utility the group agrees to decide who will use them by 
drawing straws. Although this does not violate the socialist principle of equality of opportunity, 
the resulting difference in comfort between the winners and losers would violate the principle of 
community because that principle captures the fact that on the best possible camping trip each 
camper takes care to ensure that none of their number labours under challenges the others do not 
face.24   
Cohen also imagines a camping trip governed by capitalist norms of private property and 
market exchange. For example, he posits a situation in which one of the campers stumbles across 
a huge apple tree during a walk but only agrees to share the apples with the others if they reduce 
her labour burden. He also posits a scenario in which the campers come across a cache of nuts 
abandoned by a squirrel and another camper, who alone knows how to crack the nuts, says she 
will only share that information for a price.25 Because this is such unattractive behaviour Cohen 
claims that socialist norms are rather obviously “the best way to run a camping trip”.26 Cohen notes 
that we cannot simply infer from the fact that these principles are desirable on the camping trip 
that society wide socialism is desirable.27 However he thinks that there are no serious obstacles – 
other than obstacles of feasibility – facing these principles. As a result his argument is premised on 
the idea that we can, in fact, infer that society wide socialism is desirable.  
Jason Brennan’s Why Not Capitalism? aims to prove, contrary to Cohen, that various 
capitalist principles capture the best way of living together. To do so, Brennan chooses a different 
thought experiment, the Mickey Mouse Clubhouse Village.28  In the village, Mickey Mouse, Minnie 
Mouse, Donald Duck, Daisy Duck, Goofy, Clarabelle Cow, Pete, Professor Ludwig Von Drake 
and many other characters live together. Various facilities exist that help them to carry out their 
projects. Hence, there are “communal spaces, such as amphitheatres, racetracks, obstacle courses, 
and parks” and the villagers “avail themselves of the facilities collectively”. Much like Cohen’s 
campers, the villagers also “have shared understandings of who is going to use them and when, 
under what circumstances, and why”.29 However certain objects and resources are privately 
owned. The villagers’ moral perfection ensures that they all “work hard to add to the social 
surplus” by trading “value for value”.30 As a result each villager “is free to pursue his or her vision 
of the good life without having to ask permission from others” but “all the villagers are extremely 
kind. If anyone has any unmet needs, the others line up to help him or her” and for this reason 
“force is not necessary to maintain social order”.31 Because of these perfect motivations the 
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villagers “live together happily, without envy, glad to trade value for value, glad to give and share, 
glad to help those in need, and never disposed to free ride, take advantage of, coerce, or subjugate 
one another”.32  
Five capitalist principles are realized when the villagers live like this. The first is the 
principle of voluntary community, which holds that “people should live and cooperate with one 
another without resorting to violence or threats of violence” with the result that “no one is 
coerced or threatened into behaving well or cooperating with others”.33 The second, the principle 
of mutual respect, is that “the villagers are tolerant of one another and their differences in taste and 
attitudes…villagers take joy in the diversity of life experiences and perspectives the others bring 
to the table”.34 The third principle realized is the principle of reciprocity: the “villagers always pitch in 
to help with others’ misfortune…they do not primarily confront one another as creatures of 
need. Rather, they trade value for value with one another in all of their relationships”.35 The 
fourth principle is the principle of social justice: the villagers “live under a set of rules designed to 
ensure that no one, through no fault of his or her own, will lead a less than decent life”. This is 
because the village’s “norms of trade, private property, respect, and so on, ensure that everyone 
has sufficient opportunity, wealth and freedom to have a good chance to live out his or her 
individual conception of the good”.36 Finally the village realizes the principle of beneficence because 
the villagers “are always willing to help those in need”.37  
Because the villagers respect these principles, they take care to ensure that they “do not 
make themselves objects of charity by choice – that would violate the spirit of reciprocity”. If they 
are unfortunate enough to suffer from bad luck, Brennan argues that their fellow villagers will 
“come together to ensure that any such crisis is resolved” because each villager is prepared to 
“undertake personal sacrifices for the sake of the common good for others”.38 Because this is a 
morally inspiring vision of collective coexistence, Brennan insists that “even if the limits of human 
motivation are not a constraint, we should still advocate capitalism, not socialism”.39   
 
What’s wrong with unconstrained utopianism 
We have three options regarding how to judge the Cohen-Brennan dispute:   
 
1) That Cohen’s socialist principles capture the morally ideal way of living together. 
2) That Brennan’s capitalist principles capture the morally ideal way of living together. 
3) That neither Cohen’s socialist principles nor Brennan’s capitalist principles capture the morally 
ideal way of living together.  
 
In this section of the paper I will defend 3. My skepticism derives from a worry about the method 
Cohen and Brennan endorse rather than concerns about the internal plausibility and consistency of 
their argumentation. The problem is that by stipulating what perfect moral motivation consists of 
and creating thought-experiments in which all inhabitants happily comply with contrasting 
principles of property ownership it is difficult to think about how we can defend one set of 
principles over the other.40 This in turn calls into question the idea that unconstrained utopianism 
can tell us how we can best live.   
To defend my claim about the futility and normative indeterminacy of unconstrained 
utopianism I will now elaborate a further thought-experiment which asks what decisions morally 
perfect people would make in a different context. I will argue that an answer to this question 
delivers a third set of ideal distributive principles. This is meant to function as a reductio ad 
absurdum of unconstrained utopianism as a method for telling us how we should live.  
 
Flat in The City   
Three perfectly morally motivated acquaintances – Boris, Priya, and James – have just graduated from 
Provincial University. Because none of them enjoy living alone they have decided to rent a flat together when 
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they move to The City to begin the graduate training programme at The Company.41 That summer in The 
City only one three bedroom flat with identically sized bedrooms is available to rent, although various studio 
flats are available. Graduate trainees at The Company earn £5 per month. However, in addition to their 
salary Boris and Priya will receive an additional £10 per month each from a fund they created to invest some 
money they won when they were members of the Provincial University Poker Society. Having grown up in a 
religious household that outlawed gambling, James did not join the Provincial University Poker Society but 
devoted his free time to writing unappreciated poetry.   
According to The City’s statistical office after housing costs £2 is the minimum amount of income 
someone requires to have a decent standard of living while £4 gives that person the resources to have a good 
chance of enjoying a flourishing life. The flat’s rent is £9 a month. Boris, Priya and James need to decide how 
to pay the rent. They consider the following options:    
 
1) The group decide to split the costs evenly as Boris and Priya have no reason to help James enjoy anything 
above a decent standard of living. Therefore after paying the rent Boris and Priya have £12 while James has 
£2.  
 
2) So that James can have a good chance to live a flourishing life, and because neither of them enjoys doing it, 
Boris and Priya decide they will pay £4 and James will pay £1 but only if he agrees to do all the housework. 
Therefore after paying the rent Boris and Priya have £11 while James has £4.  
 
3) So that James can have a good chance to live a flourishing life the group decide that Boris and Priya will pay 
£4 and James will pay £1. Therefore after paying the rent Boris and Priya have £11 while James has £4.  
 
4) The group decide to collectivise their income of £35 and deduct the rent from the flat’s wealth fund. Therefore 
after paying the rent £26 remains. This is distributed by the flat’s spending committee according to its 
judgment of each flatmate’s needs.  
 
How would Boris, Priya, and James choose to pay the rent if they were perfectly morally 
motivated? It strikes me as reasonably uncontroversial to hold that morally perfect flatmates 
would not choose 1 as they would want James to have a good chance of living a flourishing life 
rather than a merely decent one at little cost to themselves.42 However, I also think that Cohen 
and Brennan’s principles deliver this verdict so this does not help me to build my case. Option 2, 
however, is perfectly compatible with the spirit of Brennan’s capitalist principles. Indeed 
labouring in this way appears to be the only way that James can satisfy Brennan’s reading of the 
capitalist principle of reciprocity. However, it is implausible to think that if Boris and Priya were 
perfectly morally motivated they would want James to labour for them in their shared home in 
this way because this would sully the relations that obtained between the flatmates. It therefore 
appears that Brennan’s capitalist principles would not be chosen by perfectly morally motivated 
flatmates. 
Cohenite socialists would find 3 problematic because James’ reasons for not gambling are 
outside of his control as they are the result of an upbringing for which he should not be 
disadvantaged.43 Therefore, Cohen would urge us to adopt 4. However, there are plausible 
reasons for thinking that a perfectly morally motivated James would not want to opt for 4. For 
one thing, he might not want to lay claim to the benefits that Boris and Priya enjoy from being 
talented poker players who have taken care to hone their talents. James might also acknowledge 
that adults make different choices in life and that even though these choices are often conditioned 
by factors outside of their control, they can sometimes deserve their results.44 James accordingly 
might think that in certain situations, provided people do not fall below some minimum baseline, 
expecting them to bear the burdens of their decisions is not worrisome even if inequalities in 
outcome result. He therefore might not want to treat Boris and Priya’s winnings as a collective 
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resource and even claim that that would violate his sense of self-respect by diminishing his ability 
to take responsibility for his religious beliefs and literary aspirations.45  
If so, we have reason to hold that perfectly morally motivated flatmates would opt for 3 
over 4.  The decision to choose 3 realizes two social democratic principles which hold that justice 
requires us to a) ensure that no person falls below the minimum baseline at which they can expect 
to have a good chance of living a flourishing life and b) strive to create social relations which 
enable all people to maintain their self-respect (rather than aiming to correct for all unchosen 
disadvantages) by ensuring that no-one should labour under burdensome challenges others do not 
face, or be forced to be subservient to the wills of others, if these burdens could easily be 
alleviated via unobjectionable redistributive strategies.      
Have I just proven that social democracy and not socialism or capitalism occupies the 
moral high-ground?  While my thought-experiment has as much claim to have done so as Cohen’s 
camping trip can claim to deliver the moral superiority of socialism, and Brennan’s village the 
inherent value of capitalism, I don’t think I have because I deny that unconstrained utopianism can 
deliver such truths. This is because although I think morally perfect flatmates would indeed opt 
for 3, Cohen is also surely right that the best possible camping trip would be governed by the type 
of socialist norms he elaborates, and Brennan gives us reason to believe that the capitalist 
principles he adduces would play a valuable role in ensuring that the clubhouse villagers live lives 
of meaning and contentment. If this is the case, and each thought-experiment is compatible with 
unconstrained utopianism’s theoretical strictures, it appears that affirming socialist, capitalist and 
social democratic principles are all possible outcomes of perfectly morally motivated decision 
making in different contexts. This calls into question unconstrained utopianism’s claim to be able 
to deliver compelling judgments about the inherent moral superiority of competing distributive 
principles over their alternatives because these sets of principles are in tension with one another. 
The most powerful way to show that any one of the three options is the intrinsically best 
way to live would be by demonstrating that adhering to its principles would also generate the best 
possible camping trip, village and rental decision. However the fact that Brennan chooses to 
employ a different thought-experiment to Cohen to showcase the moral value of capitalism strikes 
me as tacit acknowledgement that he knew he could not better Cohen’s thought-experiment on 
its own terms. Likewise, I did not seek to show that my social democratic principles would create 
happier campers or cartoon villagers. As a result why think that the clubhouse village, or the 
camping trip, or the decision that perfectly morally motivated flatmates would make, teach us 
anything about how we should live in general? Yet this is what unconstrained utopianism claims to 
do as it purports to show us the intrinsically morally desirable way we could live together and 
holds that if a set of distributive principles really was intrinsically morally desirable they represent 
the best possible way morally ideal people could choose to regulate their conduct.46 Yet Cohen, 
Brennan, nor I cannot be said to have shown that about our favoured principles absent further 
argumentation.  
This demonstrates one of the most pressing problems with unconstrained utopianism: if 
political theorists can stipulate perfect moral motivation, happiness, and merry compliance, an 
array of competing distributive principles are likely to look morally inspiring from within the 
strictures of the thought-experiments they create so long they are competent thought-
experimenters. However, as soon as we ponder the general desirability of the principles by 
applying them to different contexts, where agents are by stipulation also perfectly morally 
motivated, it is highly likely that their attraction diminishes.47 It is accordingly very difficult to 
give conclusive reasons for favouring one of the set of principles we are currently considering 
over the other two simply by reflecting on the thought-experiments in their own terms. In each 
case the denizens of the thought-experiments live flourishing lives and none of them experience 
any resentment because they happily comply with the principles adduced. 
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 To this end, perhaps we should interpret Cohen and Brennan as offering existence proofs 
– that is, as offering reasons to think that there are possible worlds in which socialist or capitalist 
principles capture how we would ideally live. However if I am right, when we devise other 
situations in which morally flawless decision making would unearth alternative sets of principles, 
it becomes obvious that such proofs tell us surprisingly little about how we should live at a more 
general level. In this regard we can be skeptical of unconstrained utopianism’s claim to tell us how 
we should live by doubting the robustness of the principles it purports to deliver.48 To wit, any 
decision in favour of socialism, capitalism or social democracy simply on the basis of our reactions 
to the three thought-experiments will be the consequence of one of the thought-experiment’s 
ability to generate more in the way of our approbation, awe or veneration than the others. And 
that reaction, absent further justification, is clearly deeply idiosyncratic.49  
If unconstrained utopianism is to move us beyond this situation of normative 
indeterminacy it must enable us to come to a judgment about which thought-experiment, if any, 
delivers the general truth about how we should live – a truth we can then employ to determine 
which set of distributive principles we should ideally endorse. What considerations might we 
appeal to make this decision? Roughly speaking two options confront us. One is compatible with 
unconstrained utopianism’s methodological stance but will probably fail to lead us to any 
determinate conclusions about which set of principles capture the truth about how we should live 
in general. The other may lead to a determine conclusion but it appears to be incompatible with 
unconstrained utopianism as a methodological stance. 
The first option is simply to engage in even more utopian theorizing. Perhaps we should 
postulate more thought-experiments populated by morally perfect/flawless agents and consider 
which of the three sets of distributive principles would generate better results overall. However, 
the reasonable conclusion to draw on this front (based on past experience) is that convergence is 
very unlikely. This is because the ability of different principles to generate the kind of hypothetical 
results of which we will maximally approve is just as likely to depend on the nature of the 
thought-experiments as the inherent moral superiority of the principles themselves. This is why, 
as we have seen, different principles capture the actions and decisions that morally perfect 
campers, cartoon villagers, and flatmates would make. Moreover, as Brennan demonstrated by 
offering his account of the Mickey Mouse Clubhouse Village and as I demonstrated with my 
discussion of the rental decision, the number of internally coherent candidate principles is likely 
to proliferate in line with the number of theorists seeking to ground their favoured political 
programs by constructing their own utopian thought-experiments. For this reason simply 
engaging in more utopian theorizing is unlikely to deliver a concrete judgment about how we 
should live. 
The second option is to argue that one of the thought-experiments better models 
something theoretically relevant about the context to which it is meant to apply and that this gives 
us reason to take its findings more seriously as a guide for how we should live. Miriam Ronzoni 
argues that Cohen’s thought-experiment is inadequate on such grounds precisely because: 
 
The camping trip is distinct from everyday life and society in two … morally important respects: (1) the fact 
that, for the duration of the camping trip, the realization of its communal and frugal values are the central goal 
of its participants, rather than being something that needs to be balanced with other legitimate and valuable 
competing goals that people may have, and (2) its discontinuity in time.50  
 
To this end, Ronzoni argues that “the rules of the camping trip might be desirable for the camping 
trip given its point and purpose and specific features of its constraints and participants – and yet not 
be appropriate for other scenarios”.51 For that reason, Brennan might allege that we should 
endorse his capitalist principles because the clubhouse village is much more analogous to the kind 
of society we are interested in theorizing. For one thing, its social arrangements will last for an 
indefinite period whereas camping trips are, as Ronzoni notes, short with a definite end point. In 
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addition, Brennan’s villagers explicitly do not display the kind of goal monism Cohen’s campers 
do and this captures something morally significant about free societies.52  
Nevertheless it does not follow from the fact that Brennan’s thought-experiment is a 
more adequate model than Cohen’s that it is adequate enough. If we can only choose between 
competing internally consistent accounts of moral perfection by asking which model best applies 
to the practice we are reflecting on then we have to think hard about what that practice is like. 
This is because what perfect moral motivation requires varies according to the practices or 
relationships we are considering – as we all know, a perfect family member will display different 
motivations toward you than a perfect colleague.53 Thus if we are to decide which of Cohen’s, 
Brennan’s, or my principles tell us about the nature of the ideal society we need to think hard 
about politics and social order.54 Unconstrained utopianism’s practitioners are strangely 
insensitive to this issue because while they claim to be reflecting on the principles which should 
govern society they make little or no effort to focus on any of the specificities of politics. This 
problematizes their attempt to tell us how we should live because if they do not endorse an 
underlying conception of the political that has some plausibility which they seek to idealize, they 
can, at most, claim to tell us how a set of agents who display few of our characteristics could live 
well in a series of dissimilar contexts. And to put it polemically, while it might be interesting to 
know how morally perfect campers or cartoon villagers or flatmates would act (although equally 
it may not) such knowledge is not especially important. 
Although it is foolish to hope to give an exhaustive definition of the political55 there are 
certain phenomena which seem uncontroversially central to any account of politics which are 
notably absent from all of the utopian thought-experiments we have considered thus far. First, it 
is uncontroversial to state that politics is about exercising power to settle disputes.56 Second, it is 
“integral to political rule to invoke at least some claim to authority and thereby to 
legitimacy…which implies some recognition of this on the part of citizens”.57 To this end political 
authority, unlike warfare or Mafioso coercion, is a “relationship of command and compliance 
where compliance is not elicited by threats, persuasion, or incentives, but by the subject or citizen 
acknowledging that those who rule have a right to do so”.58 If the above purposefully broad, and 
obviously incomplete, characterisation of some constitutive features of the political is, at least as 
far as it goes, reasonably incontestable, this represents a serious problem for Cohen and Brennan’s 
brand of unconstrained utopianism because their thought-experiments make no reference to these 
features of the practice of politics which, if I am right, compromises their claim to deliver 
principles we can employ to assess our political societies.59  
The problem is that unconstrained utopianism’s practitioners insist that if we are to find 
out how we should live we must posit a situation in which all people are perfectly morally 
motivated and ask what principles would govern their interactions. However we cannot choose 
between the conflicting normative principles delivered by competing models of moral perfection 
without asking which model best relates to the practice we are seeking moral guidance about. 
This means that any utopian theory which reasonably purports to capture a set of principles we 
can use to assess our political societies must make some claim to be idealizing political society 
rather than some other practice like a camping trip or a cartoon village. If any adequate normative 
model of political society must acknowledge that beyond small-scale, close-knit groups, power 
will have to be exercised to settle disputes, we can conclude that by imagining away the exercise 
of power, Cohen and Brennan’s brand of utopian thinking is incapable of offering a plausible 
account of the principles that ideally ought to govern our political societies. This is because the 
attractiveness of living in accordance with principles Cohen and Brennan adduce is dependent on 
the voluntaristic nature of their models. Such models cannot tell us in their own terms which 
principles should regulate the exercise of power or what forms of authoritative social order are 
the most normatively appealing.  
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Working from within   
The foregoing argument paves the way for a more constructive sketch of how we should theorize 
which is not entailed by my critique of unconstrained utopianism but which has an elective affinity 
with it. I will attempt to vindicate this claim by examining an issue which sheds light on how to 
responsibly idealize certain relationships and practices – the question of how we could best 
theorize the features of an ideal or perfect friendship. One possible way of theorizing the 
character of an ideal friendship would be by imagining a relationship between two morally perfect 
agents in which the friends’ interests and value-judgments always aligned (due to their perfection) 
with the result that they never disagreed or fell-out and then thinking about the goods such a 
friendship would realize (the intimacy generated by a unity of will and judgment, care, closeness, 
and perhaps an enjoyable sense of shared moral superiority) and the resulting principles which 
would underwrite the friends’ conduct. Let’s call this the utopian way of thinking about 
friendship. Alternatively, consider the possibility of theorizing for a case of ideal friendship in a 
way that is constrained by our experiences of the features of the best friendships we actually enjoy 
as imperfect moral beings. Theorizing in this way, I surmise, would lead us to realize that an ideal 
friendship is one that evinces high-levels of intimacy, care, and closeness for other-regarding 
reasons60 despite the fact that great friends may occasionally disagree and fall-out for myriad 
reasons. The advantage of this latter approach is twofold. First, it grasps, in a way the utopian 
account cannot, that one of the most valuable things about the best friendships we can enjoy is the 
knowledge that certain disagreements and fallings-out will not destroy the intimacy, care and 
closeness we have built up with our close friends in the way that they might with minor 
acquaintances.61 For this reason it is only the second approach that can actually understand the 
nature of the goods that prevail among close friends. Second, we might also think that 
disagreement and argument is part of a good friendship precisely because we often need someone 
to tell us to amend our ways, to point out how we might inadvertently have been acting like an 
arsehole, and to keep us on the straight and narrow. A friendship in which someone didn’t feel 
free to disagree and argue with you, in the knowledge that the friendship is secure, would be 
limited.62  
Arguing that an ideal friendship would display a perfect alignment of interests, desires, 
and value-judgments, and that ideal friends would therefore never disagree or fall-out, is not a 
matter of sanitising some of the nonideal features of the friendships we experience in the real 
world. Instead, it banishes some things that are incredibly normatively significant about deep 
friendships – the ability to maintain closeness despite certain kinds of disagreement and to be 
called to account by someone you trust – which enable us to understand why those relationships 
are so valuable in the first place. It will consequently be a very bad guide to what an ideal 
friendship would be like. As a result, we can see that theories that wish away various features of 
our lives (the non-alignment of our interests and value-judgments) for merely being the result of 
our imperfections may fail to understand the nature of the goods that certain practices and 
relationships can realize.  
This reveals that theorizing in a way that is sensitive to the non-alignment of interest and 
judgment, and other all too human characteristics, does not always represent a problematic 
capitulation to the morally nonideal because we may only be able to grasp the normative 
significance and character of some relationships or practices – and the nature of the goods they 
enable us to enjoy – in light of such constraints. This matters when we come to think about how 
we can responsibly idealize political society because while power may need to be exercised in 
response to the kinds of disagreements we experience which result from typical human 
characteristics, banishing these from our theoretical models may preclude us from adequately 
grasping the normative characteristics of politics in the same way that it would preclude us from 
understanding the value of close friendships. In this sense, foregrounding our theorizing in an 
appreciation of why we need politics, and consequently need power to be exercised, matters 
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because we are unlikely to be able to appreciate the nature of the distinctive renderings of the 
goods that politics can enable us to enjoy – “order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of 
cooperation”63 – and at its best social justice, liberty and toleration – if we postulate the kind of 
perfect moral motivation which renders opaque our reasons for valuing these goods in the first 
place. It is equally hard to understand why we would need theories of legitimacy, authority and 
maybe even justice if human beings did not repeatedly encounter the predictable problems that 
result from our need to live together despite our supposed moral imperfections.  
This is why refusing to allow our theorizing to be constrained by any of the things that 
unconstrained utopians dismiss to the domain of the nonideal, imperfect, or morally blemished, is 
unlikely to help us to think about political values or the principles which tell us the truth about 
how we should live in political society – just as utopian theories cannot tell us what an ideal 
friendship would be like or make sense of the values it would realize, unconstrained utopianism 
cannot tell us what an ideal political society would be like or make sense of the values it would 
provide. The mistake is not merely that Cohen and Brennan forget that even perfect people 
would need government, although that is true.64 More significantly they attempt to offer 
principles to assess our societies by constructing models which, as a result of stipulating an 
alignment of private moral judgment and motivation, forget why politics is of value to creatures 
like us. This precludes them from understanding the character of the goods we can reasonably 
hope to strive for in society which in turn compromises their claim to tell us which principles 
ought to regulate our conduct.65    
David Estlund holds that complaints like mine, which argue that theorizing for a case of 
moral flawlessness absurdly assumes “away politics itself” are impotent because “a lot of work is 
being done in this objection by a definition” and it simply does not matter if the theory under 
examination does not count as political philosophy because “this would leave entirely intact its 
claim to have a correct theory of justice, authority, and legitimacy”.66 However, if the best way to 
choose between competing, internally consistent, theories of moral flawlessness and the principles 
they prescribe, is to ask which thought-experiment best idealizes the practice it is supposed to 
apply to, unconstrained utopians cannot evade interpretative considerations about the nature of 
the practice they claim to be theorizing about. It is unfair to impugn this as a matter of arguing by 
definition given that if unconstrained utopianism is to generate any determinate considerations 
about how we should live we must make recourse to such interpretative claims.    
It might also be thought that my view violates what is right in Cohen’s celebrated thesis 
about the fact-insensitive nature of normative principles.67 Cohen denies that facts can constrain 
our normative thinking because even if facts sometimes seem to exclude certain principles, 
ultimate normative principles may have the conditional form: “One ought to do A if it is possible 
to do A”.68 However, contrary to Cohen’s surmise objections to this line of thinking do not have to 
invoke feasibility constraints. Indeed, my point is not that we should reject some of the ultimate 
principles unconstrained utopianism adduces because they are politically infeasible per se. It is 
rather that certain kinds of utopian theorizing fail to idealize the practice they claim to deliver 
truths about and therefore cannot in good faith claim to tell us how that practice should be.69 
Various utopian principles fail to apply to politics because they are derived from models which 
theorize a different practice – as we have seen many of Cohen’s ultimate normative principles 
which take a conditional form will only apply to happy campers, Disney cartoon characters, or 
perfectly morally motivated flatmates. Political theorists are not interested in that kind of star-
gazing but in uncovering the constellation of principles that apply to politics.  
 
Conclusion 
Despite the seductive nature of the arguments in favour of unconstrained utopianism, we should 
reject the idea that our political theorizing must begin by positing a vision of a utopia populated by 
perfectly morally motivated people who can do away with political machinery. This is because the 
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principles such theorizing delivers are unlikely to be robust enough to plausibly guide our 
judgement of how we should live in political society. Moreover, I have suggested that because 
unconstrained utopianism is incapable of grasping the need for political rule and understanding 
some of the distinctive goods that politics enables us to enjoy, it is incapable of offering a plausible 
idealized account of the kind of political society that we should aspire to. Some philosophers may 
protest that my argument rests on a merely stipulative conception of the political. Be that as it 
may: as Bernard Williams once remarked, you cannot always “blast someone into seeing the 
point”.70 And the point that normative political theory should speak to politics rather than some 
other practice entirely is worth making because the methodological starting point favoured by 
some very influential political philosophers is structurally engineered to obscure it.                
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